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The dualistic nature of humans has been recognized for centuries. The intriguing question
is the extent to which the human being with her/his display of concern for others can
simultaneously act as an egoist, the latter being descriptive of the AOVZO oeconomicu,r rendition of
the human. Multiple utility theory suggests a way to approach research on such issues. A test case
of water conserwng technology adoption behavior by Florida growers is examined. Empirical
evidence supports moving toward an expanded version of the mono-utility or I-utility model to
include a We-utility.
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The search for ways to improve on the
neoclassical economics model came about in a
somewhat fortuitous manner. A PhD student by the
name of Leandro Rola and I were funded by the
Florida office of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service
to help set a cost share level that would lead to
Florida Panhandle area farmers adopting soil
conserving practices. We approached the problem
with derived demand and profit maximizing
behavior theory. Mr. Rola did his best to apply this
model with limited success. Especially unsettling
was the fact that any one of several “socioeconomic
variables” such as age, education, perceptions, and
attitudes commonly used in the conservation
adoption literature, see e.g., Ervin and Ervin (p.
287) improved the statistical properties of the
derived demand model, even though derived
demand theory did not suggest why this may be the
case. Dr. Rola went back to the Philippines and I
embarked on an odyssey, more specifically a
shopping trip, into the behavioral science literature.
The journey led into anthropology,
psychology, and sociology, eventually settling into
social psychology. Maybe it was the frustration
revealed in the latter literature that intrigued me.
The social psychologists were suffering a crisis in
the discipline (See Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977) which
by now I was convinced we in Ag Econ should be
having especially with respect to the conservation
technology adoption literature. While they had
spent decades evolving the concept of attitude and
relating it to behavior, the empirical evidence was
sparse that there was much of a relationship at all.
This was especially disturbing in that the attitude
concept is a close kin to the utility idea, in that
attitude reflects and measures latent utility. It was
singularly significant in that the Ag Econ adoption
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literature also had not established there was much of
a relationship at all between adoption and the
variables suggested by derived demand theory.
Looking back, the Ajzen and Fishbein
(1977) contribution went a long way toward saving
the social psychology discipline by clarifying the
need to carefully align action, target, tlmc and
context. Both the socioeconomic variables, e.g.,
attitude and the action “ins~all a conservation
practice,” had to be measured at the same level of
specificity. As they note (p. 889), “a given action
is always performed with respect to a given target,
in a given context, and at a given point in time. ”
Thus, a general attitude favoring conservation
practices being applied in the Great Plains cannot be
expected to predict a specific farmer action like
buying a minimum tillage grain drill in North
Dakota in March in order to reduce soil erosion
during the upcoming spring wheat season on a
particular field: the levels of specificity need to
match. This was extremely insightful. Possibly
even more importantly, they argued the need to
account for that part of context pertaining to the
social norm, i.e., that perhaps the North Dakota
farmer’s perception of what others In the
community think is appropriate behavior may well
affect a decision. The problcm in the conservation
adoption Iiterature became clear: variables with
widely different levels of specificity were being
used, and modeling was being accomplished without
due regard to measuring community influences.
These pseudo-neoclassical frameworks in the sense
that variables such as age, education and perception
were making there way into the models were
leading to predictably low explanatory power. The
conservation adoption literature (see Nowak’s
review) is lacking in theoretical justification for
such variables which also leads to mistakes in
selecting the levels of specificity.
Significantly, a few economic researchers
have been recognizing something is missing. To
their credit, Ervin and Ervin included the variables
“SCS cooperator” and “whether the farm is in an
organized watershed” and thus implicitly
recognized the need to account for perceptions
about the social norm. These analysts were clearly
thinking about something beyond the neoclassical
theory of derived demand.
The social psychologists and a few
economists seemed to be on to something: the
shopping trip started to produce usable fruit.
Findings in Lynne, Rola and Shonkwiler and Lynne
and Rola provide evidence of the need to be careful
with specificity, and possib[y even more
importantly, that there was some community
influence beyond self-interest affecting farmers.
The search was refocused for even better ways to
account for how the “We” affected the “I” in the
decision to install technology. The “I” and “We”
terminology parallels the use in Etzioni ( 1988b).
Problems With the Self-Interest Formulation of
Behavior Motivation
This problem is not new. We have to go
back at least to Adam Smith and need to recognize
(see Kolm) Hume, Edgeworth, Marshall, Walras,
Bentham and not the least, John Stuart Mill. All
have had concerns about the dualistic nature of the
human. This duality led Smith to write two books:
the Wealth of Nations with its appreciation of the
self-interest seeking, “l” nature of humans, and the
Theory of Moral Sentiments, with its recognizing
the attention that the individual pays to the “We”
captured poignantly in Smith’s words (cited in
Kolm, p. 22)
How selfish soever man may be
supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their
happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it,
except pleasure of seeing it.
Yet, the Wealth of Nations suggested that it was not
benevolence but rather the pursuit of self-interest
guided by the invisible hand, that leads to national
wealth. Kolm (p. 22) notes this contradiction
between Smith’s two works was even given a name
by German scholars, “Das Adam Smith Problem.”
In effect: How can the human with her/his concern
for others simultaneously display the egoistic
behavior of homo oeconomicus? And, could a
society based on egoistic action truly become
wealthy while denying any interest in the fortune of
others? These are important questions: at the
largest scale, at stake here is the technology weJ Agr and Applied L’con , July, /995 69
adopt and subsequently how we organize ourselves
to live together on this planet, Much of the debate
over sustainability and the need to have not only a
socioeconomic but also an ecological economics is
at base about these matters.
Recent Writing on Alternatives
Three especially significant papers need
attention, Sen, Ra~ional Fools: A Cri~ique Of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory;
Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways
of Complicating Economic Discourse; Etzioni
(1986), The Case for a Multiple Utility Conception,
and the book by Etzioni ( 1988b), The Moral
Dimension, Toward a New Economics. The titles
suggest an ongoing remodeling of neoclassical
theory will require us to sacrifice the simplicity of
the single utility model, and to rethink the strict
adherence to the narrowness of the neoclassical
rationalisty assumption. Importantly, a not
insignificant portion of the profession is starting to
recognize this need: there are well over 100
derivative works from the Sen paper alone.
Sen is concerned that egoism, i.e., that the
“l” is activated only by the pursuit of self-interest,
while persistent in economics is not particularly
realistic. Even Edgeworth, who clearly favored the
eogistic model, argued (cited in Sen) “the concrete
nineteenth century man is for the most part an
impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian. ” The 20th and
21st century man may be no less so.
Sen (p. 3 18) wonders why Edgeworth in
his 188 I Mathematical Physics book still retained
the unrealistic assumption of egoistic humans in
pursuing general economic questions, much like
modern economics, Might it be just that economics
can consider only certain types of decisions? Many
decisions will then fall outside the realm of
economics, including (I suspect) virtually all
technology adoption decisions. Sen (p, 3 18) points
out that even if one does not wish to address the
broad social interest it still may be necessary to do
so in the large middle ground between the claims of
oneself (the self-interest) and the claims of all (the
community interest), with that middle ground
including the claims of many groups, “...families,
friends, local communities, peer groups, and
economic and social classes. ”
Maybe modern economics has been
narrowed so that it can address only that set of
behaviors where the “We” does not matter. For the
day-to-day purchases of personal items, like
toothbrushes, a hamburger for lunch, and gasoline
for the car, for example, there may well not be a
substantial “We” component. In fact, just maybe
many questions addressed in Ag Econ simply do not
command attention to the “We.” Not true,
however, for the Ag Econ resource economist trying
to estimate contingent values, the Ag Econ rural
development economist assessing community
cohesion in the face of economic change, and the
Ag Econ production economist trying to understand
how a veal grower might react to animal rights
groups protesting hanging calves in straps or an
environmental group calling for the regulation and
maybe even the banning of certain pesticides.
Sen introduces the ideas of Sympathy,
Meta-Ranking, and Commitment. He notes how an
“I” may be sickened when slhe hears of torture,
which uncovers sympathy for the “We”, and may
indeed do something about it, disclosing
commitment to the “We”. Both cases suggest
action which does not serve the “l” self-interest.
Sympathy describes the case where the “l” is
psychologically dependent on someone elses
welfare, as captured in the idea of interdependent
utility. Commitment is substantively different,
revealing a dimension of the human psyche
pertaining to personal welfare, as unique from
personal choices. Sen(p, 329) notes how
commitment “drives a wedge between personal
choice and personal welfare, and much of traditional
economic theory relies on the identity of the two” .,.
the wedge demonstrated by (p. 327) “...a person
choosing an act that he believes will yield a lower
level of personal welfare to him than an alternative
that is also available to him,” Sen (p. 330) notes
how commitment is probably not important for
consumer good purchases although commitment
may enter more indirectly in the need for honesty in
market trades, For the public goods, people are not
always free riders: there is in fact commitment.
Sen’s meta-ranking adds the further idea of the
ranking of preference rankings, or meta-moral
ranking (p. 338).
Sen’s (p. 323) bottomline is straightforward
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structure. It tries to do too much, in that choice
may often reflect a compromise already made
between 1 and We considerations. It also does too
little, in that the model presumes that one can
observe choice to know preferences.
What structure do we need? Sen is
suggestive. There must be some way to account for
what is good from both the social (We) and the
individual (1) point of view, The structure needs to
provide ways to consider rankings of preference
rankings (p. 336).
This idea is reinforced and further
developed in Hirschman (p, 18) who draws on
Hirsch:
once a social system such as
capitalism convinces everyone
that it can dispense with moral]ty
and public spirit, the universal
pursuit of self-interest being all
that is needed for satisfactory
performance, the system will
undermine its own viability which
is in fact premised on civ]c
behavior and on the respect of
certain moral norms to a far
greater extent than capitalism
official ideology.
Social norms matter. He makes the case that the
pursuit of self-interest may be what is revealed in
choices, but then again maybe not in that it depends
on the type of decision. Many if not most decisions
also involve complex psychological and cultural
processes involving pre-decision reflection, which is
a part of the meta-preferences idea. A farmer may
have a meta-preference favoring soil conservation
over profit seeking and a self-interest preference for
profit. The one wining out depends upon how these
are weighed.
Hirschman sees recta-preferences as
reflecting broader social values, e.g., against wasting
soil and water. As a result, legislators may
“legislate” these values at the meta-preference Icvel,
with the hope that farmers will also change their
meta-preference for conserving water. Thus,
legislators will not usually favor pollution taxes or
emissions credits markets, or water markets, because
such market-like and market processes are seen as
e
operating at the preference level where more
fundamental value issues are not being addressed.
This is a hypothesis needing testing in light of the
fact that it may explain why corrective taxes and
emissions/resource markets are simply not otlen
used. Witness the extensive technology regulation,
generally, in the resources/environmental
Improvement arena (e.g., water, fisheries, pollution).
Hirschman (p. 18) also warns, however,
that meta-preferences reflected in the public spirit
while they may atrophy “when not adequately
practiced and applied” which leads to the self-
destruction of a system of individuals pursuing only
the self-interest, may also actually become scarce
“when preached and relied on to excess. ” Thus,
there is a need for a creative tension between the
self-interest and the public interest. Too much of
either may hurt the economy.
George provides a way to symbolically
represent the meta-preference idea. Consider the
Florida strawberry grower who is examining the
adoption of new water conserving technology (N)
over using the older higher profit irrigation
technology (0):
Mets-preference NO > ON
Preference ON
Choice o
This grower meta-prefers “a preference for new
technology over old technology” to “a preference of
old over new water saving technology,” i.e., NO >
ON, so s/he is a conservationist at heart. The
preference however is for ON, because more money
can be made. The farmer chooses to be a non-
adopter, choosing O. The farmer is rational in that
preferences and choices arc consistent. The meta-
prcference was not sufficient to override the
preference. There is chronic discord, however, or
“intrapsychic conflict” and “stress,” which may
actually reduce the capacity for rational choice
(Etzioni, 1986, p. 177), due to meta-preferences not
matching preferences.
There is another possibility. This same
grower may in fact choose N. IS this farmer
irrational, as would be suggested by the neoclassical
model, in that preference dots not lead to choice?J. Agr and Applied Econ.. July, 1995 71
The answer is clearly no: the farmer has just
rationally given her/his meta-preference for doing
the right thing more weight.
Etzioni helps us take the next step by
linking the sympathy, commitment and meta-
preference ideas to standard utility theory by
arguing that people pursue at least two irreducible
utilities, pleasure and morality. The former reflects
the pursuit of self-interest, the latter the pubiic-
interest, the “I” and the “We” as he refers to it.
Mono-utility is too parsimonious (p. 159). Etzioni
(p. 166) draws on Sen and Hirschman: Etzioni’s
moral dimension is Sen’s commitment and
Hirschman’s meta-preference. Etzioni’s (p. 169)
main concern is that pleasure seeking acts (e.g.,
more profit from irrigating strawberries) and moral
commitment (e.g., saving water is right for the
community) are sometimes incompatible.
Methodologically, add as many utilities as needed as
long as each addition sigmficantly increases our
explanatory power without introducing so many as
to experience conceptual anarchy (p. 171): he settles
on two.
The need to account for interaction is a
recurrent theme in this literature, in simplest terms,
“There is no We without a Me, but a Me needs a
We to Be,” paraphrasing a colleague, Professor
Chris Andrew. Etzioni (1988b, p. 9) suggests, “---
people are like porcupines in the cold: They freeze
if they get too far apart, but stick each other if they
get too close.” There is likely significant
interact ion between these utilities.
Why Should Agricultural and Applied
Economists Care?
It may not be necessary that all care, but
which technology a farmer chooses is a decision
with broader social consequences, as well as having
implications for the farmer’s immed]ate family. The
need for a new look at adoption modeling is
suggested by several anomalies and paradoxes,
Just why is it that farmers have obviously
non-profitable soil conservation practices like
terraces and contours on their farms”? Why don’t
they just simply mine out those farms and do
something else? The meta-preference for long-term
sustainability may be at work here. Regarding farm
equipment: why is it that farmers drive green
tractors when the just as functional and lower cost
red ones will do the same job? Might the meta-
preference for group identity be at work?
Pertaining to fertilizer and pesticide use decisions:
why do many farmers use chemicals in socially
responsible ways (granted some do not, why not)?
Might the commitment (or little commitment) to
doing the right thing be at work’?
There may also be another reason to care.
Never before in the history of American agriculture
have there been so many regulations which set out
to control “what goes on down on the farm. ”
Florida growers speak of this activity disparagingly
as “micro-management.” The reason for discord can
now be explained, especially when the meta-
preference is imposed from the outside. The meta-
preference idea can also be helpful in exploring
whether the imposition of more external control
could actually lead to less technology adoption (as
in Lynne et al., in press)
Ways to Empirically Test and Otherwise
implement These Alternatives: Look to the
Social Psychologists
All fine and good, but how are agricultural
and applied economists to assess such abstract ideas
as commitment, metapreferences and the moral
dimension in empirical work? Sen (p. 342) has
noted the empirical importance of commitment has
yet to be established. Here enter the social
psychologists.
Expectancy-value/valence models are the
link. As Feather (p. 1) notes, the model goes by a
number of names, with decision theorists calling it
the “subjective expected utility model.” As Feather
(p. 1) summarizes,
The terms expectation and
expectancy are used
interchangeably and they are
indexed in terms of the perceived
likelihood that an action will be
followed by a particular
consequence -- that is by a
subjective probability that the
consequence will occur given the
response. Similarly, there is a
high degree of overlap in the
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subjective value of the expected
consequences. Among the
concepts that have been employed
are incentive values, utilities,
valences, and reinforcement
values --
In general terms, the expectancy value model
becomes the expected utility model in the
economist’s vernacular, and suddenly we discover
that social psychologists and economists, indeed,
have much in common.
The most recent version of the expectancy
value model gaining considerable attention in social
psychology is the Theory of Planned Behavior
Model(Ajzen)
v
B-Int = ylkb, e, + y2in, m, + )’3 x Ckpk
,.1 ,=] k= I
= YIA + 112SN+ y3PBC
(1)
the first term reflecting the self-interest or 1-utility
as measured in the Attitude, the second reflecting
the commitment, meta-preferences or the moral
dimensions or the We-utility, called the Subjective
Norm by the social psychologists, and the third the
Perceived Behavioral Control. The last term
reflects the extent to which the individual has
control, i.e., volition, free-will, ability, capital, over
the ultimate behavior. In the vernacular of
neoclassical economics, there are constraints. The
components are defined as,
B= behavior, or action
Int = intention to act
b, = belief or probability about
consequences of an action
e, . evaluation, utility of the
consequence
n, . perceived beliefs or probabilities
about social norms
ml = motivation as measured by utility
from complying with norms
Ck = beliefs or probabilities about
control
Pk = power to comply.
Specifically, bi is the probability scale measuring the
degree of belief about whether that consequence
will occur as implemented by the Expectation
operator in expected utility E(U). The e, is the
utility received if the consequence occurs. Thus,
b,e, is measuring the underlying latent utility
pertaining to the self-interest. Notice these
individual components are summed to establish the
Attitude, which is a measure of latent I-utility, U’.
The social norm is composed of the nj as
perceptions of what others believe, or again, a
probability scale. The m, represents the utility
arising from acting on the 1-perception about what
others believe. Multiplying the two gives the
expected utility from paying attention to or
otherwise being influenced by the social norm, the
sum being a measure of the latent We-Utility, Uwc.
It may be that the individual has free
choice in paying attention to this UWC. The extent
to which there is free choice is examined in the
third term. This control term addresses at least
three distinct ideas described as volition (free to
choose, as Friedman says, and free-will), ability
(e.g., education, level of inherent ability) to actually
partake in such an action, and the resources or
capital available.
There will be important interactions, so
more generally,
B = f(U[,Uw”,Constraints) (2)
Compare this with derived demand theory, where
B = g(R, P, Capital Constraints) (3)
where R = vector of input prices, and P = vector of
product prices. For a local area problem, e.g.,
strawberry growers within the local Plant City area
of Florida, R and P arc essentially identical for all
growers, so
B = g (Constraints) (4)
As suggested by Equations (3) and (4), there is no
indication from derived demand that one needs to
add variables such as age, education, perceptions,
activity with the Soil Conservation Service or
whether a farmer lives in an organized watershed.
Multiple utility theory, however, suggests such
variables.J. Agr and Applied Econ , Ju~v, 199S 73
An important aside: the fact that utility is
latent suggests working with an unobservable
variable of theoretical interest for which we seek
proxies, much like physicists use proxies in their
tests of whether quarks really exist. Utility is the
economists quark, useful in thinking and theorizing
and for guiding development of proxies.
Experience With Testing
The case examined here involves Florida
strawberry growers being asked, persuaded,
“educated” and in varying degrees required (coerced
may be too strong a word, but is also somewhat
illustrative) by the local water management district
to change irrigation technologies. It might be
anticipated the social norm will be a significant
variable.
The proxy representing the We-utility was
constructed from belief statements like “My family
thinks 1 should install energy and water conserving
technology, The water management district thinks I
should install ...” on a 7-point likely, .... unlikely
scale. The evaluative component was measured by
“In general, what these groups “Family, Water
Management District.,” think I should do is
important..., unimportant (7-point scale) to me. The
index measuring the latent We-utility represents the
sum of the 12 components detailed in table 1.
Control was measured with operated acres
as a proxy for the (also latent) variable financial
capability. Various ways of measuring control
were also explored (see Hodges et al.; Lynne et al.,
in press),
Results and Discussion
Measuring the Latent Utilities
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) suggest the
design of the questionnaire. Bagozzi outlines many
important considerations in designing the scales and
testing for salient components, The farmers were
personally interviewed, for a sample size of 44 from
a population of 110 (see Hodges et al.).
Behavioral beliefs are measured with
statements such as “A drip irrigation system results
in decreasing the amount of water withdrawn from
groundwater” on a likely ... unlikely, 7-point scale.
The associated evaluative statement is “Less crop
maintenance water withdrawn from groundwater is...
important..., unimportant to me,” another 7-point
scale. With two 7-point scales, the product ranges
from 1 to 49 for each component. A total of 11
components were measured (Hodges et al.). The
global attitude “My installing a drip irrigation
system is” was also measured on three 7-point
semantic differential scales, wise-foolish, harmful-
beneficial, good-wise. Multiple regressions were
then accomplished on the global attitude measure as
a function of b,, ei, and b,e, interaction components.
The component was retained in the I-utility index if
the interaction term was significant (see Bagozzi).
The salient components are detailed in table 1.
Notice how saving water was not an element of the
l-utility: the statistically significant elements all
represent different dimensions of profit, and one
might reason, the self-interest.
Table 2 shows Type I tobit (Ameniya, chp.
1O) regression results. The first column is the
derived demand, mono-utility model: the producer
gains utility only from maximizing profits, i.e., from
spending lncomc. The capital variable is highly
significant at the 0.0 I Ievcl (table 2). Adding the I-
utility would not be expected to add any power in
explanation in that the capital variable already
captures the preferences pertaining to profit seeking.
As expected, results were not improved by adding
the l-utility (%2=0.20, not significant).
It was expected a particular level of U’
would take on meaning within the context of a
particular level of Uw”, a synergistic effect as
represented in the “1 needs a We to Be” idea.
Ajzcn argues that interactions will be important in
explaining both intentions and behavior. This is
borne out in the third column of table 2.
The measures of latent l-utility, and We-
utility are all statistically significant. [n addition,
introducing the We-utility also lowered the
parameter size on the capital variable. This
suggests the capital variable (and profit seeking)
was carrying too Iargc a burden of explaining what
was really going on. The role of l-utility is also
now better understood: the parameter on I-utility is
now significant at the 0.02 level.74 [.ynne: Modifying (he Neo-Cla.t~ical Approach to Technology Adoption With Behavioral Science Model.\
Table 1. Components of the Attitude and Subjective Norm Variables , .
Independent Components of Each Variable
Variables
I-utility reducing energy for pumping, itrcreasing labor andmrtnagement effort, reducing yield,
increasing equipment investment, reducing farm profit
We-utility fatnily, water management district, state energy office, extension andexpenment station,
growers association, county environmental protection agency, farmers and growers intlre
area, enviromnentat groups, irrigation equipment dealers, others in the community (e.g.,
homeowner water users), farmers andgrowers with whom associate frequently
Table2. WaterComewationTwhology AdoptionBehavior,Strawbeq Growers,P1mtCity,Flor[da,
1982to 1992
Capitat Adding Adding
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Dependentvariableis dollarsinvestedrndripmigationtecbnolo~y.Basedon40 observations. -.
~ Notstatistically significant
“Significant at the0.01probability y level
bSigmficarrt atthe0.02probabilitylevel
cSignificant at the0.05probabilitylevel
As a group, adding measures of the latent
We-utility was significant with a ~’ = 53.4
suggesting significance at the 0.01 level.
Conservation technology adoption behavior is more
than strictly a capital constrained, profit driven
phenomenon. The claims of other groups ...family.
equipment dealers, water district... also influenced
the decision,
Theoretical Implications
The empirical results suggest two sets of
curves now grace the indifference space, one each
for I-utility and We-utility (figure 1). The first set
U,[,...,Uj[ is the standard personal choice family of
curves found in any micro-economics text. The
second set U,‘“, .... Uqwccan be taken to represent
personal welfare in Sen’s commitment, Sen and
Hirschman’s meta-preferences, and Etzioni’s moral
dimension. The We-utility arises jointly from the
consumption of two goods ql,q2: notice it is not an
allocation of the two goods that enters the I- and
We- utility functions, but the entire sum cf the
goods consumed. Consumption of 1-loaf of bread,
the same loaf of bread, generates both 1- and We-
utility: consumption at point A generates l-utility
level U,1and We-utility level Ujwc.J Agr. and Applied Econ July, 1995





constraint and relative price
ratio are represented in pl/pz. The mono-utility
model suggests points along path OAD, such as at
A. It seems reasonable, however, that if this
particular individual put great stock in the We-
utility, i.c., put larger relative weights on the social
norm as s/he perceives it, that the path is OCD with
combinations such as at point C where Uwc is
maximized and 1-utility is only Ujl. I-utility is
subservient to We-utility for this person in that i-
utility is lower at C than any point to the left of C.
If the person is at A, I-utility dominates, as We-
utility is the lowest at that point.
For these strawberry farmers, apparently
path OAD was not chosen, but neither was path
OCD. Rather, we found the personal choice was
—~ . . We
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conditioned by the We-utility at points like B.
Farmers did not ignore their personal choice, in that
they chose Uzl > U,’. By the same token, they did
not ignore the social nom, in that U2W”> Ulwc, the
personal welfare. In neither case did they maximize
the U[ nor the UWC: rather they sought the level of
Joint utility at point B.
Sen’s idea that commitment means
choosing an act that s/he believes will give a lower
level of personal welfare than some alternative
choice can be analyzed with the model. Any point
to the right of A satisfies this condition. Sen does
not recognize that choosing greater personal welfare
is constrained, however, in that the rational chooser
would never venture beyond point C. Beyond C
(and beyond A) both I- and We- utility decline.76 Lynne, Modifying [he Neo-Clu.wical Approach [o Technology Adoption With Behavioral Science Modek
Sen (p. 327) also raised the more difficult
question of “when a person’s choice happens to
coincide with the maximization of his anticipated
personal welfare, but that is not the reason for the
choice. ” To handle this case, envision the We-
utility curves lying coincidentally, identically on top
of’the I-utility curves: moving along U,] would be
identical to moving along U[wc, in the U’ space. In
this case, the optimal path is along OAD = OCD
now being identical with OAD at points like A but
the reason for being there could be due lo relatively
more weight on the personal welfare than on the
personal choice. A mono-utility analysis would just
attribute this to personal choice and that the “I” is
motivated strictly by the chance to increase I-utility
from doing good things. This is not a serious
shortfall, in that we can comfortably predict the
neoclassical analyst will do little harm, even though
the reason for being at A is misrepresented.
The neoclassical economist tends to deal
only with the prlvatc goods, for which it might be
the case that 1-utility and We-utility curves do in
fact often overlap identically. For strawberry
farmers, the I-utility and We-utility for buying
tractors, arguably more of a private good than is an
irrigation system, might well coincide. They would
diverge for the decision to buy water conserving
technology, which has a certain publicness to it
because it draws on the common property aquifer.
The problem is that the entire area of the pl/pz
budget line to the right of A might also obtain in
the real world, especially for the public goods.
Sen’s (p. 337) idea of some preference
ranking being more ethical can also be handled.
Any set of 1-utility curves closer to the We-utility
curves satisfies this condition. One would also
move from points to the right of C back toward
more ethical points like C, in this case both l-utility
and We-utility are increased. The We-utility curves
serve to meta-rank preferences in this sense,
The We-utility could represent something
other than internally perceived social norms by the
“I” as well, e.g., it might represent an external
ideology, or political priorities, or class interests,
using Sen’s words (p. 339). It might also be taken
to represent things like, again, Sen (p. 339), “I wish
[ liked vegetarian foods more,” or “[ wish I didn’t
enjoy smoking so much. ” The We-utility can be
conceived as the ideal personal welfare indifference
set, something the individual may be trying to move
toward over time, and once there, personal and
social welfare are again identical, which again gives
coincident l-utility and We-utility curves. Maybe
the ultimate is reaching point D, as suggested by
philosopher, colleague Professor Jeffrey Burkhardt.
The We-utility idea also can help address
self-command. The Schelling (1984a, p. I) example
of the patient asking the obstetrician to withhold
anesthesia during delivery and to not put a facemask
with access to nitrous oxide nearby suggests the
patient has chosen point C after considering the
relationship to the welfare of the unborn child or
perhaps the relationship with friends who believe in
natural child birth. Point A may be chosen during
the birthing process: the patient asks others to
honor the personal welfare choice at C.
The We-utility seems a way to represent
Hirschman’s meta-preferences as the starting point.
Personal I-utility exists in the context of these meta-
preferences which we interpret to mean the We-
utility. So, we start with the meta-preferences path
OCD and decide how far we will move toward A.
In effect the meta- and personal-preferences are
traded-off against each other, with the individual
stopping at some intermediate point like B.
Etzioni’s ideas really stimulated the
perspective offered here. The We-utility
indifference set is a way to represent Etzioni’s idea
of a moral dimension (Etzioni, 1988a,b), which
conditions whether an individual selects point A or
something instead toward point C because it is the
right thing to do.
As does Etzioni, the idea of interdependent
utility often introduced to claim the neoclassical
model does account for social phenomenon is
rejected. This idea does not square with the
invisible hand theme in neoclassical economics. As
Etzioni (1986, p. 163) notes,
if people can derive pleasure
directly from serving others
and the community, there is
no need for an invisible hand
to tie their individualistic pursuits
to the common good. Moreover,J. Agr and Applied Econ., July, 1995
problems that might arise in
coordinating nonselfish actions
effectively would not necessarily
be handled effectively by the
invisible hand. It thus seems,
on grounds of sound
conceptualization, that the quest
for self-satisfaction seeking to
serve others (the public included)
out of a sense of moral obligation,
are best kept apart.
This seems most reasonable: including the utility of
others in the I-utility function suggests there is some
conscious, noninvisible (visible) action at work, but
yet the invisible hand Idea suggests it is not
necessary to have any such conscious action by the
“I.” The multiple utility model, on the other hand,
still facilitates (but does not require) the assumption
of an invisible hand ordering social relations.
A more useful notion of interdependence
operating even in a market, i.e., the invisible hand
is at work, is suggested by figure 1. With anything
less than complete overlap of I- and We-utility
curves we can reason that either the I-utility or We-
utility will be a function of the weight put on the
other as well as depending upon the price ratio of
the products: it is useful in that the focus can now
be on measuring weights, and possibly even made
the focus of policy, i.e., to change the weights with
educational efforts, or legislating weights (values) as
it were. This multiple utility model and the kind of
interdependence it depicts also does not require that
an individual know the utility gained by someone
else, a seemingly intractable requirement: the
multiple utility model is afterall focused on own
utility, just like the mono-utility model,
In the extreme case of coincident
indifference curves only the price ratio is important,
This case might describe something like justice and
anti-slave~, the two so joint that no weights are
discernible, and certainly not subjected to continual
reweighing and new choice in anything short of a
revolution (enlightment?) in thinking, Under
nonseparability conditions, i.e., coincident 1- and
We-utility curves, personal choice and personal
welfare need to be assessed simultaneously.
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It is also now easier to understand Smith:
recall the notion “...interest him in the fortune of
others... though he derives nothing from it, except
the pleasure of seeing it.” This individual might be
interpreted as being at point C deriving nothing or
at least little I-utility from it while experiencing
We-utility U,‘c, the “pleasure of seeing it.”
Critiques of Multiple Utility
The neoclassical response to the possibility
of multiple utility is usually based in utilitarianism
(see especially Brennan and comment by Lutz).
That is, people do or should if they do not mediate
the I and We dimensions into the self, Importantly,
the multiple utility model does not deny this
possibility. This phenomenon is perfectly
understandable in the internal v. external locus of
control idea (see Ajzen). If one leans toward the I-
utility, one is said to have in internal locus of
control: the I and We are mediated into the self-
interest just as described under utilitarian
philosophy. The multiple utility model, however,
also allows the possibility that the, We may not only
influence but could well dictate the direction of the
mediation process, and could in fact tilt the decision
toward We considerations, not unlike that described
in Kantian philosophy. Seemingly, the multiple
utility model can help in testing just what kind of
philosophy an individual is operating under.
Even utilitarians might be convinced of the
possibility of multiple utility because of the
phenomenon of the multiple-self. Brennan, for
example, argues (pp. 205-206) “individual decisions
should be viewed more as collective choices or
conflicts among different selves within the same
person.” He notes the phenomenon of “the daily
temptation not to go running...” and “...cheating on
a diet” as indicative of the problem. He cites
Schelling ( 1984b):
Possibly the human being is not
best modeled as a unique
individual but as several
alternatives according to the
contemporary body chemistry.
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occupy this body and nervous
system .... that people can usefully,
for some purposes, be wewcd as
jf there were two or more
alternative selves... (note: and
maybe should not even cxcludc in
modeling) the Ilteral possibility,
Seemingly, then, even the most stringent
neoclassical analysis consistent with utilitarian
precepts, and possibly even an analysis guldcd by
Austrian economics ideas, could find the multiple
utility model useful. In these cases, the meta-
prefcrcncc can simply be viewed as an aspect on a
locus of control affecting choice by the freely
choosing individual.
A Note on Emotion: The Affective Dimension of
Action
The idea of a multiple-self suggests that
while the rclatlve weighing of l-utillty and We-
utility might entail a reasoning, rational process it
does not require it. Some might indeed “feel” it
right to put emphasis on the We and deny the 1.
Feeling may especially dominate for short periods
of time even for the logical, rational thinker.
Etzioni (1988a, p. 126) claims a much
larger role for both norms and affect, arguing that
most choices reflect feelings. This raises the
possibility that pursuing I-utility might be all at
once affective, rational and normative. Another
way to think of this phenomenon IS that rational
action takes place in an emotive context driven by
the will. That is, rationality is conditioned by the
will and the emotions. This idea also allows,
however, that some actions may be dominated by
the will or norms and/or emotions, and rationality in
the narrow sense of the term as used in neoclassical
economics may not play a substantial role.
Conclusions
Hirschman cites Schelling ( 1984b, p. 342)
“the human mind is something of an embarrassment
to certain disciplines, notably economics ... that have
found the model of the rational consumer to be
powerfully productive. ” Hopefully this paper has
helped in seeing how to reduce the embarmssmcnt.
The empirical evidence suggests that accounting for
meta-preferences may be important, especially for
certain kinds of decisions, Admittedly, the multiple
utility model adds complexity, and more expensive
data collection, but just maybe the modern model of
economic behavior is too parsimonious and thus
these costs must be faced.
It appears desirable to embellish standard
utility theory in order to help in understanding and
explaining cases where people seem to be
influenced by and indeed often continue to Iivc with
incompatible meta-preferences and preferences (see
Schelling, 1984a). It highlights the possibility of
rational action even when choices differ from
preferences. The individual might indeed be simply
putting relatively more weight on the We-utility in
the cognitive, rational thinking process, or may be
responding to emotions or norms. At minimum,
applying the multiple utility model allows that one
can test for the influence of the We. Also, by not
examining what lurks behind preferences one denies
not only the possibility of discord, but also the role
of discord in stimulating changes in preferences
over time. Not accounting for meta-preferences
may bc the reason for the dismal record of
economics in forecasting, due to missing these
dynamics.
If tests support multiple utility, we may
need to modiij the conventional wisdom that acting
more in accordance with a perceived social norm or
even an emotion is somehow irrational and by
Implication bad, and move instead toward the
perception that a decision may well bc emotionally
or normatively based and could indeed be good, and
even rational. It may be necessary to broaden the
concept of rationality (also see Sen, p. 343). In
fact, the long term survival of a society with respect
to sustaining environmental resources which
generally entails more emotional, feeling based
technology adoption activity may depend upon it.
The multiple utility model’ also highlights
the need to recognize and examine the role of
internal v. external control: how does the We-utility
arise, ie., does the individual simply observe an
external social norm, and then volitionally choose to
not pay much attention to it, having a tendency,
then, toward internal rather than an external locus of
control, or is the social norm given a lot of weight
(i.e., an external locus of control), or, indeed, is itJ Agr and Applied Econ , July, 1995
imposed from the outside? The meta-idea also
suggests a way to think about the dynamics of
preference evolution which is missing in
neoclassical theory, see Etzioni ( 1986, p. 165)
possibly involving evolution toward congruence at
point D in figure 1.
The multiple utility model also helps us
square Smith’s two books: the dualistic nature of
the individual is represented in the 1-and We-utility
indifference curves of figure 1. Humans can,
indeed, have both moral sentiments and individual
self-interest, and pursue both simultaneously as
illustrated at every point within the rational region
OADC in figure 1. Said somewhat differently,
humans can, indeed, be concurrently both egoistic
and altruistic, and thus not only pursue their self-
interest but can also consider the moral dimension
of their acts, Yet, we do not have to abandon the
invisible hand assumption and thus individuals can
still be viewed as taking autonomous and
anonymous actions.
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It is peculiar why so many neoclassical
analysts reject the possibility of multiple utility.
Could it be based in political philosophy, i.e., most
analysts probably do not wish to have a world in
which the “I“ is regulated, mandated, or otherwise
controlled by an outside “We’?” Might such a
research program actually lead to control? Possibly
so. While this may be a legitimate concern, it does
not seem to also justify not considering the
possibility of both a self and norm affected
multiple-self. There is the possibility that even the
self-interested “1” with mainly an internal locus of
control might also pay at least some attention some
of the time to the “We” in making choices for some
kinds of decisions, e.g., conservation technology
adoption decisions. On a practical note, the
noticeable increase in agricultural regulation may on
its own justify more concern for the role of the
“WC” in farmer decision making. it may well be
the time for more agricultural and applied
economists to join in the quest to develop the
structure of a multiple utility theory as is the focus
of the new socioeconomic (see Etzioni, 1988b, for
starters). Shopping trips in the other social sciences
can prove useful.
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